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NOTES
Thus, certain lending institutions have thwarted the intent of Con-
gress in the Bankruptcy Act to allow the honest debtor economic re-
habilitation. At present, the lower federal courts have so limited their
jurisdiction that they have not been able to ameliorate the situation.
Furthermore, the act itself, thus interpreted by the courts, cannot solve
the problem adequately, nor give sufficient protection to the honest debtor
and creditor. There are two solutions available. The Supreme Court can
refuse to recognize the limitations placed on its announced doctrine of
"lunusual circumstances," or Congress may recognize the problem and in-
telligently amend the act to give the federal courts adequate power to
handle the problem. The latter solution seems most desirable.
THE ROLE OF JOB CLASSIFICATION IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS*
Job classification to management experts is a system for relating
jobs to each other using a set of elements inherent in varying degrees in
all jobs. To employers, job classification means a system for categoriz-
ing certain duties into certain jobs and paying wage rates for those jobs
in relation to profit gained from such jobs. To the union and the em-
ployee, job classifications are merely the particular duties the employee
performs and the pay he receives for them. A unique difficulty, which
stems from conflicting notions as to the proper function of such systems,
is injected therefore into labor-management relations by job classification.
Job classifications are established by weighing a set of elements
which exist to a certain extent in all jobs. Difficulty of work, volume
of work, responsibility of the employee, supervision required, supervision
of others, knowledge and experience necessary, and conditions under
which the work is performed, are typical elements considered.' These
factors are the crux of systems which must establish inter-plant equality
in wage rates for similar jobs, establish correct differentials for all jobs
within a plant, bring new jobs into proper relativity with existing ones,
and accomplish these goals to the satisfaction of management, the union,
and the individual employee.
The problem of maintaining wage differentials comparable to dif-
ferentials in job content is a continuing one for most industries. Because
* This paper was completed as part of the requirements in 3rd year Labor Law by
Gene B. Wilkins, A.B. 1956, Indiana University.
1. For a discussion of a job classification plan using these seven elements, see 60
Mech. Eng. No. 12 (1948).
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of the rapid changes in job content resulting from technological improve-
ments and the introduction of new job operations it is necessarily a dy-
namic problem. Job classification is one phase of the labor-management
relationship which is constantly changing during the term of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Systems of classification face the problem
of adjusting themselves to the inevitable changes in job content in order
to avoid the time and expense of continual collective bargaining. The
mechanism must be flexible enough to be easily applied when occasion
demands, but it must also be sturdy enough to maintain its general form.
Before collective bargaining there was little job classification, and
that which existed was accepted as a prerogative of management.' Job
classification has expanded rapidly with the rise of collective bargaining
and especially with the wage stabilization measures of World War II.
During World War II there was a substantial increase in the number
of plants installing and using job classification as a method of increasing
wages in spite of wage stabilization.' Continuing postwar interest in
these techniques' and their extended use indicates that a growing number
of employers have been convinced that job classification systems are use-
ful as methods of establishing some form of uniform pattern out of what
was once chaos among occupational rates.
Unions at first opposed job classification' because in the past, sys-
tems of classification had sometimes been used as a sophisticated cover-
up for rate cutting programs. During World War II, the situation
changed so that job classification began to be used as a method to boost
wage rates. Higher wage rates as a result of job classification plans
convinced many unions that it is better to solve inequities through clas-
sification systems than to leave the job rate setting and job content de-
termination entirely to management's discretion.
Union opposition to job classification frequently has a deeper basis
than simple mistrust of management's intentions. A union may have
2. Until the United States Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 in the case of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), there was
but little collective bargaining. Without collective bargaining labor obviously could have
no voice in the determination of job evaluation plans.
3. By Exec. Order No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942), the War Labor Board was
given the function of determining that wage adjusmtents conformed with the provisions
of the Stabilization Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 765, 50 U.S.C. § 901 (1955).
4. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining 163 (1952).
5. A survey made by the National Industrial Conference Board in 1948, covering
3,498 companies, showed that 59% of them had job evaluation applied to nearly all
hourly paid jobs with a higher percentage having lmiited job classification systems.
Recently the Dartnell Corporation of Chicago surveyed 96 companies regarding their
use of job classification. All but eight of these plants had installed their job classification
plans since 1940. Dartnell Personnel Administration Service Report No. 605 (1954).
6. American Management Research Association Report No. 14, Greater Productivity
through Labor-Management Cooperation 33 (1949).
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difficult problems in reconciling the conflicting internal pressures of a
diversified membership. Job classification might well upset a union's
control over the rank-and-file if the union were faced with the delicate
task of balancing the interests of skilled and unskilled workers. A union
could find itself in the position of condoning existing inequities among
job rates because of political necessity. The union could not tolerate an
uncompromising application of its own slogan of equal pay for equal
work for in some instances the balance of political forces within the
union would thereby be wrecked. For example, craft unions invariably
oppose job evoluation out of fear that it may be used with a design to
dilute job skills and thus lower existing rates.7 However, in recent years
many unions have cooperated effectively with management in programs
to utilize job classification systems in eliminating intra-plant and inter-
plant inequities.'
Although there are many kinds of scientific methods of job analysis
and classification, the success or failure of a job classification system
depends not so much on the type of plan used as on the manner of its
execution. Regardless of how any classification system is determined,
it can be successful only as long as management, the union, and the in-
dividual employee willingly accept it. This psychological factor is a vital
element in the manner in which management, the union, and the employee
use a particular classification *system. If management is unhappy with a
classification system, it can undermine the union by tampering with cer-
tain classifications under the guise of increasing production efficiency.
If the union does not like a classification system, it can plague manage-
ment with grievances over very small points. If the employee is not sat-
isfied with a classification, he can "drag his feet" in performing his as-
signed duties.
In some instances, acceptance of a classification plan by the union
and the employee can be obtained only at the price of joint participation.
Some employers may feel that fhis is too high a price, but employers are
coming to recognize, through the satisfactory operation of the plan, the
advantages of a job classification system which has been worked out
jointly.9
7. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining 164 (1952).
8. A prime example is the case of the United States Steel Corporation and the
United Steelworkers of America. Beginning in 1944, United States Steel Corporation
sought complete participation by the union in a job evaluation program. As a result of
this joint effort, intra-plant and inter-plant wage inequities have been largely eliminated
in more than 51 companies in the steel industry, employing 87 per cent of the personnel
of the industry. American Management Research Association Report No. 14, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 36.
9. See note 8 supra.
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Job content is constantly changing in a dynamic industrial system.
New operations are begun and new products are introduced. Problems
arise regarding the procedure to be followed in setting wage rates on new
jobs in such cases. Some collective bargaining agreements call for direct
negotiation every time a new job rate or a changed rate is requested."
The cost to management in the form of wages to employee members of
joint committees for determining classification questions may be con-
siderable because many changes are required in job content. This cost
must be balanced against the advantage to management resulting from
psychological satisfaction which a union receives by having been con-
sulted and made a part of the plan's determination. Other agreements
leave the setting of rates on new jobs or the adjustment of rates on jobs,
the content of which has changed, solely in management's hands, subject
to challenge through the grievance machinery.1 If the union does not
challenge the temporary rate established by management within a certain
period of time (often 30 to 90 days) the rate stands until the expiration
of the current agreement. If the union feels satisfied in having the griev-
ance procedure available without having had any part in the determina-
tion, the cost to management of the plan itself is less, but there will be
more grievances. While outside factors may cause management to prefer
unilateral determination of job classification, management can well af-
ford the concession of joint participation for the advantages of having
fewer grievances.
In plants with well-established systems of job classification the
problem of setting rates on new jobs or changed jobs is not likely to be
as troublesome as in plants with no well-defined method of wage ad-
ministration. Even under a job classification system the revision of
rates on jobs whose content has changed is sometimes a difficult task.
Because technological improvement usually moves toward work simplifi-
cation and the breaking down of complex jobs into more simple task as-
signments, the rate revision is usually downward, but there are still many
cases where added duties require a change in the classification upward.
Management retains final discretion in the operation of job clas-
sification plans in most situations today 2 notwithstanding frequent con-
sultation with the union. Outright joint participation cannot be at-
tempted safely from management's standpoint unless the relationship
10. See, e.g., 1949-1951 agreement between the John Deere Manufacturing Company,
Des Moines Works, and International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America, CIO Local Union No. 450. Davey, Contemporary
Collective Bargaining 183 (1952).
11. See, e.g., the agreement between the American Die and Tool Co., Reading, Penn.,
and the United Steelworkers of America, CIO. P-H Union Cont. Serv. f[ 53, 425.9 (1951).
12. See Dartnell Personnel Administration Service Report No. 605 (1953).
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with the union is a thofoughly stable and secure one. Even when joint
participation is an actuality, management's skepticism leads to' an insis-
tence on a collective bargaining agreement which spells out in precise
terms, the nature of the relationship and the procedure involved. 3 In
spite of management's fears of jointly administered job classificatioh
systems, such plans have worked to the satisfaction of all parties in-
volved.'4 The heart of the matter is management's reluctance to throw
classification changes into the grievance procedure and arbitration.
Arbitration awards, are not judicially enforceable nor are they ac-
corded the weight of "judicial authority" in determining future con-
troversies even between the same parties or over the same issues. They
are not conclusively binding. upon an arbitrator in subsequent cases. In
arbitration, all questions of fact and law are deemed to be referred to
the arbitrator for decision. Unless restricted by the bargaining agree-
ment, or submission agreement, or an applicable state statute, the arbitra-
tor is not bound by the strict rules of law or evidence. As long as the
arbitrator keeps within his jurisdiction he can decide the issues submitted
to him notwithstanding any prior awards between the parties unless the
parties have agreed otherwise.
Prior awards often do, however, play a part in arbitration. They
may exert a "persuasive" force which compels consideration. Prior
13. A good example is the following clause taken from an agreement between the
Sperry Gyroscope Company and Local 450, United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, CIO.
"There shall be a continuing Joint Job Evaluation Committee consisting of ten
persons, five designated by the Union and five by the Employer. The Employer
shall designate an individual to act as Secretary of the Joint Job Evaluation
Committee. When a new job is established, the Secretary will develope a job
description and evaluate such job by using the Joint Job Evaluation Manual.
The job description and evaluation of new jobs shall be submitted for approval
to the Joint Job Evaluation Committee. The Employer's and the Union's
designees on the Joint Job Evaluation Committee shall each vote as a unit on any
matter that comes before the Committee. In the event of a disagreement on any
matter before the Committee, including the question of whether a new job has
been or should be established, the matter shall be finally determined by arbitration
under the arbitration machinery set forth elsewhere in this Agreement. Such
other rules and regulations for the procedure of the Joint Evaluation Committee
shall be mutually developed by the parties as therefore arises.
"All employees hereafter hired shall be classified by the Employer with re-
course to the established grievance procedure in the event of any dissatisfaction
on the part of the employee or the Union as to his classification." P-H Union
Cont. Serv. 53, 423.27 (1951).
Few employers would be willing to go as far in the direction of joint participation
as the Sperry Company did in the foregoing clause. They would consider it an outright
surrender of essential managerial functions, because by the unit-voting procedure the
union could block any management and carry the dispute to arbitration.
14. For successful case histories see American Management Research Association
Report No. 14, Greater Productivity Through Labor-Management Cooperation 33-40
(1949).
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awards which enunciate just and reasonable principles of conduct and
contract interpretation, command respect from an arbitrator, as they do
from the parties themselves. The considered judgment of one arbitrator
cannot be lightly dismissed or ignored. Though not controlling or au-
thoritative in future cases, the award or the principles enunciated by the
award in a prior arbitration may be accepted by the arbitrator in a future
case, as any other expert or opinion evidence, if it is material to the
issues before him and may aid him in reaching a fair decision."
The role of an arbitrator in any arbitration proceedings is to assist
collective bargaining by interpreting the terms of the agreement. The
arbitrator must confine himself to this limit so as to aid collective bar-
gaining, not substitute for it. Some problems arising under job classi-
fication are not arbitrable because of certain restrictive clauses in the
agreement. In the absence of such restrictions, most problems concerning
classifications are arbitrable. In reaching a solution to classification
difficulties it may be necessary for an arbitrator to reach a final decision
as to a new or changed classification or rate; in other cases the decision
may be to send the case back to collective bargaining with instructions.
In any event the arbitrator's role is more that of an interpreter than a
negotiator.
Jurisdiction
While arbitrators by definition can be arbitrary, they tend to follow
by analogy certain judicial lines of assuming or denying jurisdiction such
as estoppel, statutory definition of jurisdiction, and the exhaustion of
administrative remedies before seeking a judicial remedy. For example,
an arbitrator has used the judicial principle of estoppel by refusing to
re-evaluate a job to determine whether it was properly classified, where
the union, despite the fact that another arbitrator under a prior agree-
ment ruled that the job was properly classified, did not question the pro-
priety of the job's evaluation and classification during the negotiation of
the current bargaining agreement. 6 Since the union did not raise the is-
sue in negotiation when it had the opportunity, the union in effect ac-
cepted the prior award as correct and by analogy was "estopped" from
raising the issue for determination by an arbitrator. Under a collective
bargaining agreement providing for changes in job classification only
if the job content changed, an arbitrator used by analogy the judicial
principle of statutory definition of jurisdiction when he refused to arbi-
trate a union's request for reclassification of a job to a higher labor
15. Federal Bearing Co., Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 721 at 726 (1954).
16. Federal Bearing Co., Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 721 (1954).
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grade on the grounds that various rating factors of the job were rated too
low, in the absence of evidence showing a change in job content." Simi-
larly under a bargaining agreement which provided that "wages" would
not be the subject of arbitration, an arbitrator declined to rule on a claim
that certain jobs were misclassified and under-rated, because such a de-
termination involved "wages."'" Using a principle analogous to "the
exhaustion of administrative remedies before applying for a judicial
remedy," an arbitrator has refused to set a wage rate for a new classifi-
cation where the parties had not exhausted the remedy of solution
through negotiation first. 9 The parties must attempt to negotiate a rate
and if they are unable to agree, the issue will be arbitrable.
Since an arbitrator's refusal to decide a case leaves the parties with-
out a solution to their problem, arbitrators are wont to give as broad an
interpretation as possible to the scope of their jurisdiction outlined in the
collective bargaining agreement. For example a dispute concerning an
employer's action in requiring certain employees to perform duties not
previously required of them was held arbitrable under an agreement pro-
viding for arbitration of disputes as to the interpretation or application
of the agreement.2" In another arbitrated case, an agreement which
limited aribtration to disputes over interpretation or application of the
agreement's terms did not bar arbitration of a dispute involving the
union's claim that the employer added to the duties of certain job classi-
fications and thereby violated the agreement.2 ' An arbitrator also has
the authority to determine proper rates for new jobs established during
the term of the collective bargaining agreement if the parties fail to agree
after negotiation even though the agreement does not specifically provide
for arbitration of job rates.22
17. Hotpoint Company, 23 Lab. Arb. 562 (1954).
18. Jack & Heintz Precision Industries, Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. 289 (1952).
19. Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 213 (1954). It was held
in this case that there was no merit to the union's claim that the rate agreed to by the
employer and another union whose members had performed all the work covered by the
classification should be declared the proper rate for this classification; it could not be
presumed that the instant parties would have negotiated the same rate.
20. Emhart Mfg. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 61 (1954). The holding in this case was in
spite of the employer's contention that the agreement clearly permitted unilateral changes
in jobs, because the union contended otherwise and further that the action in this case did
not actually constitute a change in the job.
21. John Deere Des Moines Works, 23 Lab. Arb. 206 (1954). The employer con-
tended that this grievance was not covered by any part of the collective bargaining
agreement. The arbitrator held that job classifications are an integral part of an agree-
ment and if it can be shown that the functions of a particular classification have been
altered materially, a question would be properly raised as to whether such action was
consonant with the agreement.
22. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 228 (1954).
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Typically, collective bargaining agreements approach the problem of
the procedural treatment to be given job classification revisions in one of
two ways. In one, procedures for direct negotiations are provided, but
should they prove fruitless the matter cannot be carried to arbitration."
In this event, the rate fixed by the company will presumably stand for
the duration of the agreement. In the other, although the company has
a clear right to initiate reclassification, and the necessary readjustment
of wages, this power is subject to check through the grievance and arbi-
tration machinery of the agreement.2"
Creation of New Classifications
-The largest number of arbitration cases concerning job classification
systems involve the installation of new classifications. Changes in pro-
duction methods necessitate the creation of new classifications to cover
new job content. Installation of new classifications during the term of
the collective bargaining agreement is regarded as necessary by manage-
ment and unions alike, but opinion concerning when and under what pro-
cedures new classifications should be installed is not unanimous. Both
the decision to install new classifications and the manner of installing
the new classification may be left to the sole discretion of management
or may be made through collective bargaining.
When the establishment of a new classification is left to manage-
ment, arbitrated cases have nevertheless imposed certain limits on manage-
ment's discretion.25 Under a collective bargaining agreement which
authorizes an employer to establish new job classifications whenever a
new job is established or the content of an existing job is substantially
changed, the employer is not entitled to abolish job classifications and
combine their job content with other jobs as long as "the job functions
of these classifications continue to exist in significant proportions and
in substantially the original form."2 In this case the duties of the ques-
tioned classifications still existed but were being performed by other
classifications. The right granted to management in a collective bargain-
ing agreement to create new classifications is intended to allow flexibility
in event of technological or production changes, not to allow the revamp-
23. Taken from the 1949-1951 agreement between the John Deere Manufacturing
Company, Des Moines Works, and International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, Local Union No. 450. Davey,
Contemporary Collective Bargaining 183 (1952).
24. From an agreement between the American Die and Tool Co., Reading, Penn.,
and the United Steelworkers of America, CIO. P-H Union Cont. Serv. 1 53,425.9 (1951).
25. See Lone Star Steel Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 164 (1954).
26. Lone Star Steel Co., supra note 25.
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ing of existing job contents for the convenience of the employer." Hold-
ing that a new job created during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement must consist of new operations, not a re-shifting of existing
operations, instills a feeling of stability into the classification system and
protects the union from constant unilateral changes. For unilateral
changes in job content management should pay the price of strict con-
struction by the arbitrator of a collective agreement clause granting
management the power to establish new job classifications.
The better situation is that in which management and the union en-
gage in collective determination of new jobs during the term of the bar-
gaining agreement. Not only does collective bargaining eliminate the
time and expense of the grievance procedure and arbitration, and create
a spirit of cooperation and understanding between management and la-
bor, but more importantly the psychology of employee participation leads
to greater job satisfaction and increased production. When the collec-
tive bargaining agreement contains a provision which requires collective
bargaining with the union before a change in classification, this clause
takes preference over a clause which gives the employer the exclusive
right to determine methods and means of manufacture.28 There is not
too much difficulty in interpreting an agreement which leaves the crea-
tion of new classifications to collective bargaining; the agreement is
either complied with or it is not. If collective bargaining concerning the
establishment of a new classification is called for in the agreement, this
bargaining must come before a new classification is put in operation and
cannot be in the form of discussions of the new classification under the
grievance procedure after the new classifications are in effect.29 The
object of collective bargaining on new classifications is to work them out
27. In Faultless Caster Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 713, it was held that an agreement
which permitted an' employer to establish "new" classifications did not permit him to
divide an existing classification which included both set-up and operating duties, into two
classifications and to set a different wage rate for each set of duties upon expanding from
a two to three shift operation. It was stated in this case that the right to create new
classifications was not intended to cover a mere rearrangement of duties to accommodate
shift prQblems for the convenience of the employer.
Cf. Rockwell Spring & Axle Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 81 (1956), where it was held that
an employer may not unilaterally establish new classifications of "milwright" and
"4wireman" since all duties of the proposed new classifications are covered in the "main-
tenance man" job description in the existing agreement. The language of the agreement
in this case contemplated a maintenance man performing all the duties set forth in such
job description.
28. Librascope, Inc., 18 Lab. Arb. 539 (1952).
29. An arbitrator in Armstrong Rubber Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 90 (1952), held that the
employer, by establishing a new job classification and rate without prior bargaining
with the union violated an agreement which required that the employer "meet with and
bargain with" the union on "all matters pertaining to wages, hours and other conditions
of employment." The employer's contention that discussing the new classification under
the grievance procedure was sufficient, was not allowed.
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jointly before they are put in operation. The value of a collective effort
is lost if discussions about new classifications come after the new clas-
sifications are installed.
Many of the difficulties arising from the creation of a new classifi-
cation will never occur if the new classification is established jointly.
Joint participation in the classfication area cuts into rights which have
long been considered exclusively management's, but the majority of
unions today are capable of discussing, determining, and aiding in the
installation of new classifications. Management's loss of traditional
rights will be more than offset by the success of a new classification
which has been worked out jointly.
Elimination of Classifications
The problem of eliminating job classifications during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement is similar to that of creating new classifi-
cations. Management has the right to change the means of production;
with this change come the necessity of eliminating existing classifications
before new ones can be established. The collective bargaining agreement
should therefore spell out the procedure for the destruction of classifica-
tions as well as that for establishing new ones. The duties of manage-
ment and the union in eliminating a job classification are easily confused
if the procedure for the elimination as set out in the collective bargain-
ing agreement is vague.
An employer, under a collective bargaining agreement providing
that job descriptions and classifications are to continue in effect unless
changed by mutual consent, may not unilaterally discontinue an estab-
lished classification even though the employer thinks this to be in the
interest of efficient operations."0 An employer cannot be required to
assign employees to a classification when the duties of that classification
are no longer being performed, but the duties of the eliminated classifi-
cation must be non-existent, not merely transferred to other classifica-
tions.3
An employer does have the right unilaterally to eliminate a job clas-
sification by transferring its duties to other classifications both within
and without the bargaining unit, where (1) the collective bargaining
agreement has no provision requiring all changes in job content to be
mutually agreed upon, (2) the history of a particular classification
shows a continual shift which has been made unilaterally by the employer
in the content of its duties, and (3) the transfer of duties is a result of
30. Lone Star Steel Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 160 (1955).
31. Lone Star Steel Co., supra note 30.
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rapid expansion in the company's operations necessitating more efficient
production techniques. 2
Because allowing an employer to eliminate classifications while the
work which comes under such classifications is still being performed al-
lows the employer to eliminate an employee's job arbitrarily, this power is
excessive; but operating efficiency demands the eliminations of classifi-
cations which represent jobs no longer performed. Efficient production
is a responsibility of the union as well as management, therefore it is
much better to consult the union before a classification is eliminated be-
cause such consultation recognizes union's equal responsibility. If the
union is competent it will realize the value of eliminating classifications
which are no longer necessary. If management eliminates a classifica-
tion unilaterally, the union may attack this action through the grievance
procedure. Even after collective bargaining, if management and the
union cannot get together on the elimination of a classification, the prob-
lem is subject to the grievance procedure and management is in no worse
position that it would have been had it simply made the elimination uni-
laterally. Therefore management surrenders no vital advantage by agree-
ing to joint participation.
Change of Classification
The necessity for changing a classification when the content of a
job changes during the term of a collective bargaining agreement is as
great as the necessity for the creation and elimination of classifications.
The difficulty lies in deciding the point at which the content of a job is
changed sufficiently to warrant reclassification. Any job classification
system must be flexible enough to permit the addition or subtraction of
a certain amount of duties without a change in classification. Con-
sidering the number of minor changes in job content required for suc-
cessful production, the burden on management is too great if collective
bargaining is required each time any change in job content is made. The
union should regard without prejudice minor changes by management in
job content, and in considering the use of the grievance procedure to
protest changes should evaluate the time and effort of the grievance pro-
cedure and arbitration with the value to be gained by an arbitration de-
cision in its favor. The grievance procedure should therefore be used
only to protest situations where the change in job content demands a
change in classification. Small changes in job content are more easily
tolerated by the employee if he realizes that minor duties may be sub-
32. Cochran Foil Co., Lab. Arb. 155 (1955).
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tracted as well as added to a job without a change in classification or
pay rate.
Although an employer may make reasonable changes in job content
without changing the classification, duties which are added or subtracted
must be of the same general type as the job's regular duties.33 An in-
crease in the work-load of an hourly rated job, without a change in skill,
responsibilities, experience, or initiative required, does not constitute a
change in "job content" within the meaning of a collective bargaining
agreement clause requiring an employer to establish a new wage rate if a
measurable change is made in job content.3 4 If the union believes that
added duties justify higher rates, the union may request re-evaluation
but it may not prevent the employer from making changes in job content.
On the other hand, an employer may not reduce the hourly rate of em-
ployees who regularly operate two pieces of equipment, during the period
when one piece of equipment normally operated by them is undergoing
repairs and the employees are doing less work."5
Some collective bargaining agreements provide that new classifica-
tions may be originated whenever a "substantial change" occurs in job
content.3 6 Under this sort of agreement an employer must try to make
33. See Carbide Power Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 780 (1955), wherein it was held that an
employer may add window-cleaning work in a power house to the duties of dynamo
attendants without first obtaining the union's consent because this work was a related
and connected kind of work duty that reasonably fell within the "housekeeping" duties
performed regularly by dynamo attendants. It was further stated by the arbitrator that
to hold that no reasonably related job duties may be added to a job without formal bar-
gaining with the union would deprive the employer of a "crucial" managament right and
would require a clear contract provision to that effect.
34. Continental Can Co., Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. 636 (1955); accord, National Supply
Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 666, wherein under a contract giving an employer the exclusive right
to manage the works and direct the working force and containing no provision expressly
prohibiting unilateral changes in job content the employer was within his rights in re-
moving from the oiler's job the relatively minor tasks of lubricating and cleaning cranes
and assigning these duties to cranemen, even though these duties are mentioned in the
oiler's job description and not in the craneman's. The union may request re-evaluation
of the craneman's job if it believes that added duties justify higher rates, but it may not
prevent the employer from making these changes in the content of that job.
35. Bethlehem Steel Company, 18 Lab. Arb. 727 (1952). Accord, John Deere
Tractor Works, 21 Lab. Arb. 784 (1952), wherein an employer did not have the right
to remove certain work from an existing classification and to set it up as a separate
classification with a lower rate of pay when the quantity of work increased sufficiently
to justify assigning it on a full-time basis, because even though the work originally
had been only a minor part of the existing classification and is less skilled than other
work of that classification, it clearly fell within the job description of that classification
and the nature of the work had not changed.
36. For example the agreement of Lever Brothers Co., and the United Gas, Coke
and Chemical Workers (Hammond, Ind. Plant) executed in March 1952 which states:
35. Temporary assignments or voluntary temporary tranfers shall be paid at
the employee's regular payroll-card rate or at the classification rate of the
temporary job, whichever is higher.
44. When new jobs are established, or when there is a substantial change in
NOTES
only minor changes which do not entail reclassification; however should
the nature of the change contemplated be of such substantiality as to
necessitate reclassification, such reclassification should not be attacked
by the union in the grievance procedure, because this right has been sur-
rendered in the collective bargaining agreement. "Substantial change"
is such a nebulous standard that it may permit management to make un-
desirable alterations in job content without reclassifications or may per-
mit unions to make unwarranted use of the grievance procedure by assert-
ing that change made was not substantial enough to warrant reclassifica-
tion or that such a substantial change has been made in job content to
warrant reclassification. Obviously the success of so vague a clause de-
pends on a mature labor-management relationship because of the ease
with which either party can use the clause to the detriment of the other.
Minor changes in job content which do not warrant a change in job
classification are to be expected. In the event of such minor changes,
management takes the risks of paying the same wages for a classification
when the work-load of the classification has diminished, just as the
union takes the risk of accepting the same wages when the work-load has
increased. These risks on the part of management and labor are part of
the price which must be paid for some form of stability in job classifica-
tion systems.
Work in Two Classifications
Work in two classifications is to be differentiated from the situation
of the temporary transfer from one classification to another. When
the transfer is only temporary, wage rates are paid separately for the
in the job content of an old job, the classification of the job within the existing
rate structure shall be determined in accordance with the established job evalua-
tion plan which includes the manual, job description forms, rating sheets, factor
comparison sheets, master analysis sheets, and all other forms and procedures
adopted by the Evaluation Committee, and subject to the following provision of
this paragraph.
(1) The evaluation of such jobs shall be done by a joint Union-Management
Evaluation Committee. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 59,926 (1955).
and the agreement of the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company and the Glass Bottle Blowers
Association of the United States and Canada executed in January 1955 which states:
Article VII
Sec. 2. If, during the life of this Agreement, a new job is created or substantial
changes are made in an existing job, the Company shall develop and install an
appropriate hourly rate for such job by the regular procedure in effect in the
Company, and shall discuss with the Factory Committee, prior to installation,
the new or changed job and the hourly rate which is applicable. Within thirty
days after installation of such rate if the Union disagrees with the rate so estab-
lished, the Union may regard the matter as a grievance to be handled in accord-
ance with the grievance procedure set forth in Article XX. Any new or changed
jobs which are established during the life of this Agreement will be added to
Schedule A. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 59,938 (1955).
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amount of time spent in each classification, but when the employee works
regularly in two classifications he is usually paid one hourly wage rate
for all his work. Therefore the problem is which of the two classifica-
tions may be used to determine his wage rate. This can be solved satis-
factorily by providing that the employee be paid according to the rate of
the classification in which he spends the predominant amount of his time,
or according to the rate of the highest classification in which he works.
Payment of separate rates for each type of work to employees who work
in two or more classifications is difficult and time consuming especially
when a definite line cannot be drawn between the duties of two classifi-
cations or the employee works irregularly in the different classifications.
Some plants systematically pay the employee the higher rate for all his
time when he works in two classifications, regardless of which job con-
sumes the predominant amount of his time and regardless of whether the
employee performs all the duties of the higher classification. Such a
policy eliminates accounting problems concerning amount of work and
rate for each classification, but such a plan is costly because part of the
time the employer is paying higher wages for work in a lower classifica-
tion. However management can often afford to adopt such a policy in
exchange for some desired concession in collective bargaining.
It is apparent from arbitrations concerning work in two classifica-
tions that the time the employee devotes to the duties of each classifica-
tion is not as important in determining a wage rate for his work as the
nature of the duties he is required to perform. If the employee at dif-
ferent times assumes all the duties of two or more classifications, then
he has been held to deserve payment for all his time at the higher wage
rate.37 However, if his work within the higher classification involves
only the more simple duties of that classification, the hourly wage rate
of the lower classification is considered adequate.8"
37. Under an agreement providing that each employee should be classified in
accordance with the "one" wage group which covers the class of work in which he is
"normally" employed, an employee who divided his time between two different jobs was
considered by the arbitrator normally to be employed in the higher-rated of the jobs
and thus entitled to the rate for that job at all times, even though he spent only about
20 per cent of his time on that work. Soule Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 88 (1953).
38. In Lear Inc., 23 Lab. Arb. 829 (1954), an employer was not required to pay
assemblers the rate specified in the agreement for a higher classification during the
period when they performed certain work ordinarily performed by employees in the
higher classification because the work which the assemblers performed included only
the least skilled functions of the higher classification and not the full range of skills
contemplated for payment of a higher classification wage rate. Accord, Bendix Aviation
Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 428 (1952), wherein the employer was held not to need to reclassify
employees who performed only "calibration" duties to the classification of "instrument
tests and final inspector and calibrator," even though such classification was the only
one in the classification schedule which mentioned calibration duties. The evidence
clearly showed that such classification was intended to apply only to employees performing
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Temporary Transfer to Different Classifications
Various circumstances require the temporary transfer of employees
from regular jobs to others in different classifications. The situations
which require temporary transfer are usually emergencies which occur
with no degree of regularity, such as absences or the temporary need for
certain kinds of increased production which calls for more help on par-
ticular operations. Provisions for determining pay rates for temporary
work outside the employee's usual classification may be included in the
collective bargaining agreement but plant policy and past experiences are
important in interpreting clauses concerning the rates to be paid for
temporary work outside the employee's usual classification. Thus an
arbitrator has found an agreement providing that employees temporarily
assigned to higher-rated positions should receive higher rates of pay not
to require payment at the storekeeper's rate to an assistant storekeeper for
the time the storekeeper was out of the department on union business and
the assistant allegedly performed his duties, because (1) the assistant was
never advised that he was assigned to the storekeeper's job, (2) the
duties of the two jobs were essentially identical so that work which the
assistant performed during the storekeeper's absence was actually his own
work, and (3) although the employer admittedly had the policy of pay-
ing higher rates to employees who temporarily filled a higher-rated job
even if they were not expressly assigned to such job, such a policy had
never been applied when the regular incumbent of the job was still on
the company premises, as was the storekeeper in the instant case.89
Arbitrated cases involving the temporary transfer of employees to
higher classifications show that such employees are to be paid the rate of
the higher classification for the amount of time spent in the different
classification."' Arbitrators also have held that employees may not be
all three duties included in its title. Cf. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 17 Lab.
Arb. 205 (1951), wherein it was declared that an employee who was called upon to
perform various tasks, including helping journeymen mechanics with relatively simple
and unskilled jobs, was properly classified and paid as a member of the surface labor
gang in the mine, notwithstanding the contention that he performed the work of a helper
and should have been reclassified and paid as such.
39. Rexall Drug Company, 22 Lab. Arb. 837 (1954).
40. In Phelps Dodge Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 64 (1955), an employer was required to
pay the drill operator's rate to helpers during the operators' half-hour lunch period when
helpers were required to operate drills alone, despite the contention that the operation
of the drill was a regular part of the helper's job. However, the only function of the
helper, according to the company's drilling code was to "assist" the operator, and the
helper was not "assisting" the operator when he ,operated the drill while the operator
was at lunch, but was undertaking the full responsibility of the operation. Although the
code also stated that it was "desirable" that the helper be allowed to practice operating
the drill as much as possible, this was held not to indicate that the helper had the respon-
sibility for operating the drill for set periods of time.
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paid the rate of a higher classification to which they are temporarily
transferred if the employee spends only an inappreciable amount of time
in the higher classification 4' or the employee does not perform all the
duties of the higher classification.42 Evidently the difficulty in keeping
track of small irregular amounts of work is held by arbitrators to out-
weigh the hardship worked on the employee in not being paid a higher
wage rate for small amounts of work in higher classifications. If a
temporary transfer to a lower classification is made, an employee may
still be paid the rate of his usual classification if the duties performed in
the lower classification also come under the employee's regular classifi-
cation.43 If the job content of the various classifications is included in
the collective bargaining agreement, and some definite procedure such
as a provision for paying the higher wage rate for temporary work in a
higher classification is outlined, few cases in this area will ever reach the
arbitration level of the grievance procedure.
Inclusion of Similar Duties in Different Classifications
A job description is a statement of the duties, responsibilities,
knowledge, and ability requirements of a given position or type of work.
Job descriptions are not, however, necessarily mutually exclusive. It is
not uncommon for a given function or type of work to be included with-
41. It was held in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 251 (1955), that the
employer did not violate an agreement requiring that employees "normally" be assigned
to work within their own classifications by assigning receiving clerks to the jobs of
stockroom clerks to fill these vacancies. The evidence showed that the receiving clerks
performed the work of stockroom clerks for only four per cent of the total scheduled
hours of stockroom operation over the last year.
42. In U.S. Steel Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 518 (1954) employees who were paid at
higher rates carried by another classification when they substituted for employees in
higher classifications on certain operations were not entitled to the higher rate when they
were assigned to perform on an emergency basis, a single duty of the higher paying job,
because the employees on that occasion did not perform the complete job in the higher-
paying classification but merely single tasks calling for less skill than their regular work.
But see Waterman Pen Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 335 (1956). Under an agreement pro-
viding that employees who are required to work on job classifications other than their
own shall be entitled to the rate of that classification if such rate is higher than their
regular rate, an employer was ruled to have no right to pay female finish stock clerks
their regular rate during periods when they are temporarily transferred to work of the
higher-rated materials handler classification, even though they do not at these times
perform the more arduous duties of the materials handler classification which are the
basis of the higher rate of that classification. This agreement does not require trans-
feree to perform all the duties or even the major duties of a higher classification in order
to be entitled to the rate of that classification.
43. It was held in International Harvester Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 553 (1951), that an
employee who was assigned on a premium day to work regularly performed by em-
ployees in a lower grade was improperly paid the rate of the lower grade because such
work was also expressly included in the description of the employee's own classification.
This was in spite of an agreement clause providing that when an employee was assigned
to work outside his "regular classification" on a premium day he would be paid the rate
of the job to which he was assigned.
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in more than one job description in the same plant. Where this situa-
tion exists, the complete job content of the classifications whose duties
over-lap should be considered before determining whether the pay rates
for the different classifications should be changed. If the duties which
are being performed are those outlined in classifications in the collective
bargaining agreement, the wage rates should remain as bargained for,
because if classifications are to maintain any objective validity, they must
be based on job descriptions established in negotiations, rather than an
employee's comparison of his duties with the duties of other employees.4
Employees are not improperly classified as long as they are assigned
only those duties which belong in their classifications." For example,
an arbitrator has held employees classified as "contact men" not entitled
to be reclassified to higher classifications of "follow-up men," even
though there was a great similarity between the duties and skills required
of "follow-up men." Job descriptions distinguished between the two
classifications by specifying the duties of "contact men" as being the ex-
pediting of parts manufactured within the company and those of "follow-
up men" as expediting of parts manufactured outside companies." It
would follow from this case that if there are any similarities in various
job contents in different classifications, this should be discussed in initial
negotiations concerning the collective agreement, not after the agreement
is in effect. Arbitrators of cases involving the inclusion of similar duties
in different classifications are bound by job descriptions which are a
44. Douglas Aircraft Corp., 18 Lab. Arb. 387 (1951). Under an agreement which
recognized that the same duties should be included in two or more job descriptions and
provided that each job description should be interpreted and applied in its entirety, the
employer properly classified employees who worked on the complex airplane wing as-
sembly operation as "Assemblers A," instead of the higher rated "Mechanics A," because
while they did perform a few of the same duties as Mechanics A and their job as a whole
was more difficult than some Mechanic A jobs, their work was more correctly described
by the Assembler A classification than by the Mechanic A job description; cf. Sund-
strand Machine Tool Company, 20 Lab. Arb. 752 (1953), wherein it was decided that
the fact that employers classified as assemblers might be performing substantially the
same duties as another employee classified as a mechanic did not justify up-grading them
to the mechanic classification because classifications must depend on job descriptions
established in collective bargaining rather than on comparsion with the duties of another
employee.
45. Librascope, Inc., 18 Lab. Arb. 462 (1952). Under an agreement which did not
contain any procedure for establishing new jobs but merely specified that employees
would be classified in accordance with work requirements and their ability to perform
the assigned, it was held that the employer was entitled to assign assembly work in the
model shop to assemblers from the production assembly department, despite the union's
contention that assembly work in the model shop required greater skill and should be
performed exclusively by machinists who did this work in the past. Under existing job
classifications, assembly work was a part of both the machinists' and the assemblers'
duties and there was no showing that differences of assemblers' duties on the production
line and those in the model shop were of such magnitude or significance to warrant
the conclusion that the assignment to the model shop was improper.
46. Chrysler Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. 106 (1951).
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part of collective bargaining agreements, and are not entitled to assign
persons to higher rated classifications on the basis of some esoteric and
personal concept of equity; such changes are outside the jurisdiction of
an arbitrator and can be made only by establishing new classifications."*
Duties Added to Job Content During the Term of the Agreement
An employer's act of recognizing a union and entering into a col-
lective bargaining agreement with it necessarily carries with the agree-
ment, in addition to a surrender of power to deal with any other agent,
an obligation to refrain from making "major changes" in employment
conditions and circumstances without consulting the union. However,
an employer's execution of a collective bargaining agreement does not
tie his hands or require him to consult with the union whenever he seeks
to make minor changes in the method of conducting his business."'
One such minor change which an employer may make unilaterally
without considering the reclassification of a job, is the addition of a cer-
tain amount of duties similar to those being performed under a particular
job classification.49 For example, an arbitrator has held an increase in
workload which required an employee in a baking company to handle
888 loaves of bread where the employee had previously handled only
870, to be one which management could make without reclassifying the
job to a higher classification.5" There was no contention during the
arbitration proceedings that the increase in duties resulted in an unrea-
sonably high workload for any employee. It is axiomatic that employees
paid on a straight time basis are to do "a fair day's work for a fair day's
pay." When the work is on an hourly basis, the employer is entitled to
increase or decrease the workload as long as it stays within reasonable
limitations. Thus if the union is to maintain a successful case for re-
classification of jobs when the workload has increased, the union must
convince the arbitrator that the added work increases the total beyond a
reasonable load.
There are situations and circumstances under which the addition of
more of the same kind of work may operate to alter the content and clas-
sification of a job.51 Thus an arbitrator has held an employer not to
have the right, without negotiating a classification with the union, to
47. Douglas Aircraft Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 387 at 389 (1951).
48. Pan-Am. Southern Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 612 (1955).
49. Continental Baking Company, 20 Lab. Arb. 309 (1953).
50. Continental Baking Company, supra note 49.
51. In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 277 (1951), it was stated that
an increase in the duties of a job may be grounds for re-classifying a job to a higher
grade, even though the added duties are of the same type as those regularly performed
on the job.
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require an employee to operate two saws simultaneously where it has been
a practice for many years to assign an employee to operate only one
power saw at a time. 2 As quantitative changes continue to occur, a
crucial point is reached at which a qualitative change takes place which
requires a classification change. For example, a laborer called upon
once a year to use a stick of dynamite for a period of five minutes can-
not be classified as a blaster, but if such use is increased to twenty sticks
a day for the entire or greater part of a day, he should no longer be clas-
sified as a laborer, but as a blaster. The test which should be used in
determining whether duties added to job content demand a change in
classification is one of reasonableness of the increase in workload. While
this test is one which may finally be made only by an arbitrator, manage-
ment should consider it before adding duties to existing job content and
the union should apply the test before raising a grievance protesting
such addition.
Concluion
Job classification is here to stay. It is the answer to the need for
some kind of uniformity and stability of wages in proportion to job
content. There are many different kinds of systems, each best suited
for a particular set of circumstances. The essential element in a success-
ful job classification plan lies not only in getting the right scheme for
the right conditions, but also in selling the classification system to the
employer, the union, and the employee. The more the union participates
in job classification, the smoother the system will work, but the union
must realize that expedient production methods and correct job classifica-
tions are responsibilities of the union as well as management. Under
mature collective bargaining some successful job classification system is
available to all employers and employees. It rests in them to find the
one best suited for their needs.
APPENDIX I
The scattering of decisions concerning job classifications throughout Labor Arbitra-
tion reports makes research in this area extremely difficult. The following collection is
intended to include all pertinent post Taft-Hartley arbitrations to be found in the reports.
A. CREATION 0' A NEW CLASSIkFICA- Intl. Harvester Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 306. (1952)
TION Librascope Company, Inc., 18 Lab. Arb. 539.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 25. (1951) (1952)
Intl. Harvester Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 101. (1951) Intl. Harvester Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 116. (1953)
Mfengle Co., Inc., 17 Lab. Arb. 361. (1951) Tin Processing Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 362. (1953)
Intl. Harvester Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 592. (1951) Bethlehem Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 354. (1953)
Bethlehem Steel Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 631. (1951) Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp., 22 Lab.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 697. Arb. 213. (1954)
(1951) Curtis-Wright Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 831. (1954)
Armstrong Rubber Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 90. (1952) Continental Oil Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 880. (1954)
Intl. Harvester Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 303. (1952) Emhart Alfg. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 61. (1954)
52. Gar Wood, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 605 (1954).
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Lone Star Steel Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 164. (1954)
Moraine Paper Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 696. (1955)
Faultless Caster Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 713. (1955)
Armstrong Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 721.
(1955)
United Wall Paper, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. 188.
(1955)
Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. 665.
(1955)
B. ELIMINATION OF A CLASSIFICA-
TION
Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 797.
(1953)
United States Steel Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 561.
(1954)
Reynolds Metals Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 47. (1955)
Dewey Portland Cement Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 838.
(1956)
Cochran Roil Company, 26 Lab. Arb. 155.
(1956)
Lone Star Steel Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 160. (1956)
C. CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION
Pacific Hard Rubber Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 375.
(1952)
Bethlehem Steel Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 727. (1952)
Pittsburgh Steel Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 595. (1952)
Republic Steel Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 370. (1953)
Central Soya Co., Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. 463.
(1953)
John Deere Harvester Works, 20 Lab. Arb. 665.
(1953)
United States Steel Corp., 21 Lab. Arb. 609.
(1953)
John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, 21 Lab.
Arb. 784. (1953)
Bethlehem Steel Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 340. (1954)
Kay Mfg. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 797. (1954)
Wheeler Insulated Wire Co., Inc., 23 Lab. Arb.
782. (1954)
Avco Mfg. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 268. (1955)
United States Steel Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 685.
(1955)
D. WORK IN TWO CLASSIFICATIONS
Intl. Harvester Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 550. (1951)
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 17 Lab.
Arb. 205. (1951)
Hatfield Wire & Cable Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 548.
(1951)
Sigfried K. Lonegren, Inc., 18 Lab. Arb. 352.
(1952)
L. Brossman Sons, Inc., 19 Lab. Arb. 347.
(1952)
Bendix Aviation Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 428.
(1952)
Bethlehem Steel Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 521. (1952)
Standard Oil Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 665. (1952)
Corn Products Refining Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 142.
(1953)
Soule Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 88. (1953)
John Deere Harvester Works, 21 Lab. Arb. 244.
(1953)
Hotpoint Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 562. (1954)
Lear, Inc., 23 Lab. Arb. 829. (1954)
E. TEMPORARY TRANSFER
United States Steel Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 518.
(1952)
Intl. Harvester Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 553. (1951)
Willys Motors, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 289. (1954)
Rexall Drug Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 837. (1954)
Phelps Dodge Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 64. (1955)
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 251.
(1955)
F. INCLUSION OF THE SAME DUTIES
IN TWO CLASSIFICATIONS
Chrysler Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. 106. (1951)
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., 18 Lab. Arb. 387.
(1952)
Librascope, Inc., 18 Lab. Arb. 462. (1952)
Sundstrand Machine Tool Co., 20 Lab. Arb.
752. (1953)
Erie Forge & Steel Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 551.
(1954)
G. ADDED DUTIES TO A CLASSIFICA-
TION
Thor Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. 770. (1951)
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 17 Lab. Arb.
277. (1951)
Koppers Co., Inc., 19 Lab. Arb. 358. (1952)
Esso Standard Oil Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 569.
(1952)
Continental Baking Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 309.
(1953)
Republic Steel Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 370. (1953)
Jenkins Bros., 20 Lab. Arb. 586. (1953)
Linde Air Products Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 861.
(1953)
Gar Wood Industries, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 605.
(1954)
Federal Bearings Co., Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 721.
(1954)
John Deere Des Moines Work, 23 Lab. Arb.
206. (1954)
Pan-Am. Southern Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 611.
(1955)
H. THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
IN JOB CLASSIFICATION CASES
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 16 Lab. Arb.
424. (1951)
Jack and Heintz Precision Industries, Inc., 20
Lab. Arb. 289. (1953)
Madwed Mfg. Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 718. (1953)
Mathieson Chemical Corp., 21 Lab. Arb. 361.
(1953)
Krug v. Republic Pictures Corp., 21 Lab. Arb.
364. (1953)
Brown & Sharp Mfg. Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 461.
(1953)
Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp., 22 Lab.
Arb. 213. (1954)
Federal Bearings Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 721. (1954)
Emhart Mfg. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 61. (1954)
John Deere Des Moines Works, 23 Lab. Arb.
206. (1954)
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp., 23 Lab. Arb.
228. (1954)
Hotpoint Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 562. (1954)
